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Abstract—Recent years have seen an uprise in the development
of middleboxes functionalities (CGNATs, proxies, accelerators,
etc), participating so in the ossification of the Internet. In parallel,
various solutions have been developed to detect or circum-
vent unwanted middleboxes interferences such as UDP-based
middlebox-proof transports (Google’s QUIC, PLUS), middlebox-
proof extensions to TCP (HICCUPS, TCPcrypt), and middlebox
traversal mechanisms (STUN, ICE, PLUS) [1].
All those solutions make the assumption of ubiquitous mid-
dleboxes. However, a view of their actual deployment in the
wild, in IPv4 wired networks, is missing. In particular, knowing
how autonomous systems (ASes) deploy middleboxes in terms
of prevalence and persistence would provide additional relevant
information to Internet topology models. In this paper, we aim at
filling this gap. Based on a large-scale measurement campaign,
we highlight different characteristics of middlebox deployment
within ASes to elicit middleboxes profiles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the standard and well-known description of the
TCP/IP architecture (i.e., the end-to-end principle) is not
anymore applicable in a wide range of network situations.
Indeed, enterprise networks, WiFi hotspots, and cellular net-
works usually see the presence of middleboxes being part of
the network architecture in addition to traditional network
hardware [2]. A middlebox is a network device inspecting,
filtering, or even modifying packets that traverse it. It performs
actions on a packet that are different from standard functions
of an IP router.
Recent papers have shed the light on the deployment of
those middleboxes. For instance, Sherry et al. [2] obtained
configurations from 57 enterprise networks and revealed that
they can contain as many middleboxes as routers. Wang
et al. [3] surveyed 107 cellular networks and found that
82 of them used NATs. D’Acunto et al. [4] analyzed P2P
applications and found that 88% of the participants in the
studied P2P network were behind NATs. Middleboxes may
be deployed for several reasons, typically security (e.g., IDS,
NATs, firewalls) and network performance (e.g., load balancer,
WAN optimizer).
However, if there is a widespread usage of middleboxes,
they come with important drawbacks. Indeed, it has been
shown that middleboxes have a negative impact on the TCP
protocol (and its extensions) evolution [5], [6]. Middleboxes
may modify, filter, or drop packets that do not conform to
expected behaviors. As a consequence, the Internet faces a
kind of ossification due to the difficulties of proposing new
transport protocols.
Researchers, when designing a new protocol, have thus to
cope with a middlebox-full Internet. Each new mechanism
has to be certified as middlebox-proof [6], [7]. For those
researchers, a summary of the potential middlebox network
interferences would be a valuable asset as they could easily
confront their new protocol with potential issues caused by
middleboxes.
Recent years have seen the emergence of new network
measurement techniques that aim to achieve this objective (i.e.,
revealing the presence of middleboxes and characterizing their
behavior). Medina et al. [8] report one of the first detailed
analysis of the interactions between transport protocols and
middleboxes. They rely on active probing with tbit and con-
tact various web servers to detect whether Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN), IP options, and TCP options can be safely
used. The TCPExposure software developed by Honda et
al. [5] is closest to tracebox [9]. It also uses specially
crafted packets to test for middlebox interference. Wang et
al. [3] analyzed the impact of middleboxes in hundreds of
cellular networks. This study revealed various types of packet
modifications. More recently, Craven et al. [10] proposed
TCP HICCUPS to reveal packet header manipulation to both
endpoints of a TCP connection. HICCUPS works by hashing
a packet header and by spreading the resulting hash into three
fields (in case one is changed).
However, to the best of our knowledge, nothing has been
really done to characterize the middleboxes deployment in
terms of prevalence for ASes (e.g., if a firewall is setup, do all
traffic goes through that firewall?)1 and persistence over time
(e.g., is a middlebox up and running all the time? Or do we
observe any dynamics as for IP networks? [11], [12], [13]).
This would be valuable in any effort in modeling middleboxes
interference and in getting a first look at how ASes actually
deploy middleboxes.
This is exactly what we want to tackle here. In this paper,
based on a large dataset we collected with tracebox on
IPv4 wired networks, we are able to investigate middle-
boxes prevalence and persistence. Analyzing the data, we
highlight different characteristics of middlebox deployment
within autonomous systems and elicit middlebox profiles.
For instance, on the contrary to enterprise networks [2], our
observations show that, in general, ASes do not deploy that
much middleboxes compared to standard Layer-3 devices.
1It is worth noticing that prevalence has already been investigated by Sherry
et al. [2], but at the enterprise level. In this paper, we propose a broader vision
of middlebox deployment by considering ASes at large.
Fig. 1. Middlebox detection with tracebox.
Those middleboxes do not affect a large portion of the paths
(in 20% of the cases, a middlebox may affect more than half of
paths traversing an AS) but are, in the majority, deployed at the
AS border. Finally, we also demonstrate that the majority of
middleboxes are stable over time (i.e., do not exhibit dynamic
features). Our dataset is available online.2
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. II
provides details on our measurement campaign; Sec. III ex-
plains how we preprocess the large amount of collected data;
Sec. IV discusses results about middleboxes prevalence while
Sec. V focuses on middleboxes persistence over time; finally,
Sec. VI concludes this paper by summarizing its main achieve-
ments and discussing potential future research directions.
II. DATASET
This section describes the dataset we collected. In particular,
Sec. II-A describes tracebox, the tool we used for collecting
data, while Sec. II-B provides details about our measurement
methodology and general statistics.
A. tracebox
To reveal the presence of middleboxes along a path,
we use tracebox [9], an extension to the widely used
traceroute [14].
tracebox mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 1. It relies
on RFC1812 [15] and RFC792 [16] stating that the returned
ICMP time-exceeded message should quote the IP header
of the original packet and respectively the complete payload
or the first 64 bits. tracebox uses the same incremental
approach as traceroute, i.e., it sends packets with different
IP, UDP, or TCP fields and options with increasing TTL values.
By comparing the quoted packet to the one sent, one can
highlight the modifications and the initial TTL value allows
us to localize the two or more hops between which the change
took place. In Fig. 1, the source sends a TCP packet, a, with
IP-TTL of 3. The middlebox, located between hop 2 and hop
3, modifies (for instance) the TCP Initial Sequence Number
(ISN) and forwards the rewritten packet, b to the next hop.
When the router located at hop 3 receives the packet, the TTL
has expired and it sends back to the packet source an ICMP
time-exceeded packet c containing packet b as a payload.
When the source receives it, it is able to compare packet a and
the payload of packet c to detect any changes and the initial
2https://observatory.mami-project.eu/
Fig. 2. Uncertainty zone when locating middleboxes.
TTL value, i.e., 3, allows tracebox to bound the middlebox
location. The router that reveals packet modifications in the
ICMP time-exceeded message is called the informant
router.
Depending on whether or not routers along the path imple-
ment RFC1812 [15], that recommends to quote the entire IP
packet in the returned ICMP, tracebox locates precisely the
source of the modification or introduces a location uncertainty
we called uncertainty zone. The two cases are shown in Fig. 2.
In the first case, the informant router (at TTL distance of
2 from the vantage point in Fig. 2, part 1) sends an ICMP
time-exceeded message that highlights a modification of
a field that lies within the first 48 bytes (i.e., the IP header
and the first 8 bytes of the transport header, e.g., the TCP
ports and Sequence Number). Because all routers include at
least these fields in the ICMP payload, we are able to locate
the middlebox between the informant router, not included, and
the previous router (at TTL distance of 1 from the source in
Fig. 2). However, when the modification performed by the
middlebox is outside the first 48 bytes (i.e., after the first 8
bytes of the transport header, e.g., from the Acknowledgment
Number to the end of the TCP header), it can only be revealed
by a RFC1812-compliant router. Therefore, an uncertainty
zone may appear between the informant router, not included,
and the previous RFC1812-compliant router. In Fig. 2, part 2,
the uncertainty is located between TTL 2 (from the vantage
point) and TTL 4 (not included). Sec. II-B will evaluate
the probability of encountering a RFC1812-compliant router
along the path, while Sec. III will explain how one could fix
difficulties related to uncertainty zones.
B. Measurement Methodology
We deployed tracebox on wired IPv4 networks via
PlanetLab. We selected the maximal number of nodes available
for each campaign (between 108 and 129). Destinations have
been selected using the top 1M Alexa website that we resolved
once to 594,241 unique addresses beforehand. We conducted
14 campaigns over nine different ports (80, 8080, 8000,
8800, 443, 53, 12345, 1228, 34567) with TCP SYN probes
Campaign Raw Data Middleboxes
ID Port #IPs #ASes #Probes #Paths w/MB #ASes w/MB
1 80 886,065 2,953 40,392,061 2,175,335 337
2 80 886,263 2,955 42,774,781 2,382,938 347
3 8000 816,656 2,891 24,860,295 1,773,409 252
4 80 887,171 2,950 41,767,341 2,346,832 334
5 8080 816,192 2,897 24,252,300 1,667,765 226
6 8800 820,653 2,889 38,750,758 1,673,998 241
7 443 856,918 2,938 41,590,151 3,415,643 364
8 12345 813,152 2,880 39,234,092 2,286,052 311
9 8080 813,955 2,895 22,466,692 1,609,383 220
10 80 884,808 2,955 42,866,154 2,369,670 342
11 1228 812,213 2,885 39,489,438 2,282,698 329
12 443 882,658 2,955 41,593,420 3,454,363 361
13 34567 820,305 2,893 39,225,840 1,806,605 269
14 53 820,698 2,887 39,202,907 2,784,658 260
HTTP 930,842 2,969 250,983,908 5,696,282 510
non-HTTP 888,596 2,939 267,482,322 3,011,418 368
Total 948,457 2,977 518,466,230 5,832,789 661
TABLE I
GENERAL STATISTICS ABOUT DATA COLLECTED WITH TRACEBOX , AFTER FILTERING, BEFORE PRE-PROCESSING.
including TCP options (MSS and SACKP) for a period of two
months between March, 3rd and May, 8th 2016, each campaign
lasting between three and seven days. The total amount of
data collected corresponds to 1.3TB. This dataset is available
online. 3
Once the raw data collected, we selected the nodes that
remained available during all campaigns (89 PlanetLab nodes).
We also filtered out PlanetLab-related errors and kept only
probes that reached the destination or that expired or triggered
an ICMP message after at least 10 hops. Doing so, we obtained
an exploitable dataset made of 518 millions probes. 34% of
those probes reached the destination, 64% expired, and 2%
triggered an ICMP message before reaching the destination.
The high amount of timeout is due to probes with non-
HTTP ports that are dropped by a firewall before reaching the
destination. From this filtered dataset, we extracted 38 millions
observations of middlebox behavior (i.e., a single modification,
addition, or deletion of single field of a probe, on a single
path, in the course of one campaign). We note that we did
not witness any significant difference in middlebox behavior
towards HTTP and non-HTTP probes, apart from the fact that
HTTP probes are less likely to be blocked, and thus are able to
highlight more middleboxes. For the remaining of this paper,
we process HTTP and non-HTTP evenly, at the exception of
the persistence analysis (Sec. V).
During the entire measurement campaign, we observed
948,457 different responsive hops (excluding vantage points
and targets addresses), scattered over 2,977 different ASes.
The most represented ASes are Cogent (35.7% of all addresses
– Tier 1 network), CenturyLink (10.6% – Tier 1 network),
Telia Carrier (6.3% – Tier 1 network), NTT (3.4% – Tier 1
network), Rackspace (1.8% – cloud services), Level3 (1.6%
– Tier 1 network), and Chinanet (1.5% – Chinese ISP).
The corresponding addresses are geographically distributed in
North America (40.4%), Europe (37.5%), Asia (18.7%), Latin
3https://observatory.mami-project.eu/













Fig. 3. Proportion of RFC1812-compliant routers on a path. The “2013”
curve (green) is from Detal et al. [9].
America and Caribbean (2.7%), and Africa (0.7%) according
to the regional Internet registries. The same addresses were
registered under 189 different country codes. Table I provides
additional general statistics about data collected. In particular,
the last two columns show the importance of middleboxes in
the dataset.
Fig. 3 shows the proportion of RFC1812-compliant routers
(the horizontal axis) as a CDF. A value of 0, on the hori-
zontal axis, corresponds to paths that contained no RFC1812-
compliant router. On the other hand, a value of 1 corresponds
to paths made only of RFC1812-compliant routers. In par-
ticular, in 2013 (green curve), in 80% of the cases, a path
contained at least one router that replies with a Full ICMP.
Nowadays (2016 – black curve), the situation is clearly better.
Roughly, in 90% of the cases, a path at least contain one
RFC1812-compliant router. In addition, in half of the cases,
30% of routers along a path are RFC1812-compliant routers.
This means that, nowadays, tracebox has the potential to
reveal much more modifications by upstream middleboxes.
It is also worth to notice that the more RFC1812-compliant
routers, the less uncertainty zones.
Fig. 4. An example of probes pre-processing.
III. PRE-PROCESSING
Before studying middleboxes prevalence and persistence
over time, the dataset must be cleaned through a 3-step
preprocessing, as illustrated in Fig. 4. The objective beyond the
preprocessing is to merge multiple tracebox observations
of a given middlebox into a single identifier. The first step
(Sec. III-A) allows to identify a so-called offender, i.e., the
router preceding the middlebox on a given path. Second,
offenders are grouped together to obtain the profiles of ob-
served middleboxes behavior (Sec. III-B). Finally, offenders
are aggregated into unique middleboxes (Sec. III-C).
A. Offender derivation
First, we assign a label to each observation of middlebox
behavior. As middleboxes can be located between two routers
with consecutive ICMP-triggering TTLs (i.e., there is no
uncertainty zone), we arbitrarily choose to label a middlebox
with the IP address of the router preceding the middlebox on
the path. This router is called offender. This is the perfect
case as there is no uncertainty zone and the location of the
middlebox is, therefore, certain. However, when there is an
uncertainty zone, heuristics must be applied to narrow, as
much as possible, the zone size so that we are able to identify
an offender and, thus, label the middlebox. In addition to
identifying the offender IP address, we also perform IP2AS
mapping, using Team CYMRU [17], on the offender IP
address. This process of identifying the offender is called
offender derivation. Algorithm 1 provides a high level view
of the offender derivation heuristics.
The trivial case is when there is no uncertainty zone (lines
9 → 11 on Algorithm 1). In this configuration, we pick the
address of the router preceding the informant router as the
offender IP address (in Fig. 2, part a, offenders are identified
for three observations4). When there is an uncertainty zone,
4An “observation” here stands for the identification of a packet modification
attributable to a middlebox
Algorithm 1 Offender derivation
1 def o f f e n d e r ( p robe ) :
2
3 u = probe . u n c e r t a i n t y
4 i n f o r m a n t _ t t l = p robe . i n f o r m a n t . t t l
5 p r e v i o u s _ h o p = probe . hops [ i n f o r m a n t _ t t l − 1]
6 o f f e n d e r _ i p , o f f e n d e r _ a s = ’∗ ’ , ’∗ ’
7
8 # No u n c e r t a i n t y zone
9 if u == 1 :
10 o f f e n d e r _ i p = p r e v i o u s _ h o p . add r
11 o f f e n d e r _ a s = p r e v i o u s _ h o p . asn
12
13 # H e u r i s t i c 1 : No answer a t TTL−1
14 i n f o r m a n t _ m i n u s 2 = probe . hops [ i n f o r m a n t _ t t l − 2]
15 elif u > 1 and p r e v i o u s _ h o p . add r == ’∗ ’ :
16 o f f e n d e r _ i p = i n f o r m a n t _ m i n u s 2 . add r
17 o f f e n d e r _ a s = i n f o r m a n t _ m i n u s 2 . asn
18
19 # H e u r i s t i c 1 b i s : No answer a t TTL−2
20 elif u > 2 and i n f o r m a n t _ m i n u s 2 . add r == ’∗ ’ :
21 i n f o r m a n t _ m i n u s 3 = probe . hops [ i n f o r m a n t _ t t l − 3]
22 o f f e n d e r _ i p = i n f o r m a n t _ m i n u s 3 . add r
23 o f f e n d e r _ a s = i n f o r m a n t _ m i n u s 3 . asn
24
25 # H e u r i s t i c 2 :
26 # F i r s t o c c u r e n c e o f major AS i n u n c e r t a i n t y zone
27 else :
28 u z o n e _ s t a r t = i n f o r m a n t _ t t l − u
29 uzone_end = i n f o r m a n t _ t t l
30 uzone = probe . hops [ u z o n e _ s t a r t : uzone_end ]
31 as_uzone = [ hop . asn for hop in uzone ]
32
33 m a j o r _ a s = most_common ( as_uzone )
34 if as_uzone . c o u n t ( m a j o r _ a s ) > 1 :
35 a s _ i n d e x = as_uzone . i n d e x ( m a j o r _ a s )
36 o f f e n d e r _ i p = uzone [ a s _ i n d e x ] . add r
37 o f f e n d e r _ a s = as_uzone [ a s _ i n d e x ] . add r
38
39 # H e u r i s t i c 3 : S t a r t o f u n c e r t a i n t y zone
40 else :
41 o f f e n d e r _ i p = probe . hops [ u z o n e _ s t a r t ]
42 o f f e n d e r _ a s = probe . a s e s [ u z o n e _ s t a r t ]
43
44 return o f f e n d e r _ i p , o f f e n d e r _ a s
we attempt to apply different heuristics. First, if the router
at the informant TTL minus one or two did not respond to
the probe (i.e., three consecutive timeouts for a single TTL
value), we pick the previous router, respectively at offender
TTL minus two or three, as the offender (lines 15 → 23 in
Algorithm 1). Second, we map the IP addresses of the routers
in the uncertainty zone to AS numbers and select the most
frequent one (lines 28 → 31 in Algorithm 1). We choose
to pick the first router that belongs to the major AS as the
offender, but only if it was also used for labeling via the
first heuristic or the trivial case. Otherwise, we keep only
the offender AS. Finally, if neither heuristics succeeded, we
select the first router of the uncertainty zone as the offender.
If this router was not used for labeling by any other heuristics,
we disregard the offender IP address and AS number for this
observation (lines 33 → 42 in Algorithm 1).
Note that our dataset contains 2.25% (21,330) of ad-
dresses from non publicly-routable address spaces (10.0.0.0/8,











Fig. 5. Size of Uncertainty zones.
172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16), 0.1% (905) from CGNAT
shared address space (100.64.0.0/10), and 2.18% (20,669)
that were not mapped to an AS. We keep such addresses as
offenders only if the routers at the ends of the unresolved
address zone are mapped to the same AS.
In parallel, we compute the position of the offender within
the AS. If the routers that precedes and follows the offender
are parts of the offender AS, we mark the middlebox position
as internal to the AS. If either one of them is not part of the
offender AS, we set the position to border of the AS.
Fig. 5 gives the distribution of the uncertainty zone, as a
cumulative mass, in our dataset. We see that, in 41% of the
cases (15.5 millions over the 38 millions of observations),
there is no uncertainty zone (size of 1). Moreover, in 60%
of the cases, the uncertainty zone has a size less or equal
to five. In those cases, we expect the location heuristics
to be reasonably accurate. Finally, as we have observed an
increase in RFC1812-compliant router deployment (see Fig. 3)
we expect, in the near future, that the uncertainty zone size
will decrease more and more, leading to a better location of
middleboxes.
At the end of this first step, we were able to derive offenders
ASes for 99% of the observations, and to derive offenders IP
addresses for 20 millions (52%) observations. The first set of
observations (i.e., offenders with AS numbers) is kept for AS-
level analysis, the second (i.e., offenders with IP addresses)
serves as input to the second step of the preprocessing.
B. Offender grouping
Next, single path observations are grouped together based
on the previously derived offenders. This is illustrated on
Fig. 4, part b. In the first stage, offenders were derived for three
observations. During this second stage, offenders grouped into
two offender profiles (1.213.1.210 and 1.213.1.214 on Fig. 4,
part b) based on the address, and regardless of the informant.
The goal of this step is to obtain a profile of observed
middlebox behavior, to cross-check offender derivation heuris-
tics and to rule out observations conflicts. Indeed, an offender
profile contains several relevant pieces of information, such as
the amount of paths it affects (see Sec. IV), its dynamics (see
Sec. V), and the set of next hops.
As mentioned in the previous section, the observations for
which offenders were obtained via heuristics 2 or 3 must
correlate with at least one observation for which offenders
were derived with heuristics 1 or the trivial case. To ensure
this, the modification of fields and value in each observations
must corresponds, i.e., it concerns the exact same fields and
similar values. With the exception of modifications that are
not observable on certain path because of the absence of any
RFC1812-compliant router after the offender. We also make
sure that an offender derived with any heuristic but the trivial
case is backed up by at least ten single observations to avoid
reporting inconsistent middlebox behavior.
Then, we solve the remaining conflicts (that can be related
to errors in traces, punctual network conditions causing probe
loss, a middlebox reconfigured during a campaign, or the
inherent tracebox uncertainty) by applying a threshold of
one twentieth on the variability of the observed positions and
modified fields. For example, when we have different offender
positions for the same offender, we pick the most widespread
if it accounts for at least 95% of this offender’s observations
and that it remains constant during each campaign. We are
able to obtain a constant position for 89% of offenders while
2% appear to have moved between campaigns. The remaining
9% of offenders position are either unresolved conflicts or
inconclusive. For addresses whose ASes were resolved during
the offender derivation step, we note the absence of conflict
on the AS resolutions.
This second step allowed us to identify 8,322 offenders in
our dataset.
C. Offender merging
Finally, we attempt to merge offenders when we believe
they refer to the same middlebox. The merging is done with
IP prefixes, as illustrated in Fig. 4, part c, where offenders
1.213.1.210 and 1.213.1.214 are merged in prefix 1.213.1.0/24.
The following criterions are considered for merging:
• All offenders IP addresses are part of the same subnet-
work (/24).
• All offenders were observed applying the same set of
modifications, or subsets of modifications in case certain
were not observable (i.e., fields outside the first 48 bytes
with all routers located after the offender being RFC1812
non-compliant).
• For all affected paths of each offender, the set of IP
addresses located after the offender (at offender TTL plus
one) are equal.
If all criterions are met for groups of two or more offenders,
they are merged. During this step, 515 offenders were aggre-
gated into 198 prefixes. We achieve to recompute the profile
of the middlebox, considering all merged offenders as one.
We obtain 8,005 aggregated offenders, that we will now use
as different middleboxes, distributed in 343 different ASes.
Anecdotically, we observed 7 cases of Multi-Origin AS
Conflicts (MOAS) [18] (i.e., addresses parts of the same /24
being mapped to different ASes), but none of them were
candidate to offender merging.
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(c) AS topological location of middleboxes
Fig. 6. Middlebox prevalence evaluation.
IV. MIDDLEBOXES PREVALENCE
Once the dataset has been cleaned by the 3-step prepro-
cessing (see Sec. III), one can start looking at middleboxes
prevalence. We define the prevalence of middleboxes for an
AS as being the importance of the middleboxes at three
levels. First, we envision an infrastructural deployment of the
middleboxes, i.e., the proportion of middleboxes deployed by
the AS compared to typical Layer-3 devices (IP interfaces or
routers). This allows us to know whether ASes are deploying
as many middleboxes as Layer-3 devices, as previously stated
for enterprise networks [2].
Fig. 6(a) shows the proportion of middleboxes deployed
by ASes as a fraction of IP interfaces discovered in our
measurement campaign (plain line) and as a fraction of
routers (dashed line – the alias resolution has been performed
using CAIDA’s ITDK dataset [19]). At the AS level, the
deployment of middleboxes (compared to Layer-3 devices)
is rather marginal5 compared to Layer-3 devices. In general,
less than 5% of the deployed infrastructure is dedicated to
middleboxes. For instance, Cogent (the most observed AS in
our measurement campaign) deploys between 1% and 1.5%
of middleboxes compared to Layer-3 devices.
Second, we consider the middlebox popularity, i.e., the
fraction of paths, inside an AS, that is harmed by at least
one middlebox (this information is directly derived from step
2 in the preprocessing – see Sec. III-B). A value of 0, for
the popularity, would mean that all observed paths traversing
the AS do not encounter a middlebox (and, as such, the AS
does not deploy any middlebox). On the contrary, a value of 1
means that all observed paths are harmed by a middlebox. In
that extreme case, one can say that middleboxes are prevalent
as they impact every packet traversing the AS. Fig. 6(b) shows
the middlebox popularity (X-Axis) as a cumulative mass. We
observe that in 20% of the cases, more than 50% of the
AS paths are affected by a middlebox. This suggests thus
5Obviously, the amount of observed middleboxes in our dataset is strongly
related to the way we performed the measurement campaign. And, in
particular, results are biased due to the target being the Top 1M Alexa web
sites. We, however, believe that results given in this paper are a lower bound,
giving so a first insight on how ASes deploy and use middleboxes.





GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF MIDDLEBOXES LOCATION WITHIN AN AS.
that, in some cases, middleboxes are prevalent, even if, in
general, an AS does not deploy that much middleboxes in its
network. However, it is worth noticing that this metric has its
inherent limits. For instance, more than 44 millions of paths
are traversing Cogent, and we detect middleboxes presence
on more than 2 millions of them. This gives a popularity of
“only” 5%, while we believe middleboxes are quite prevalent
across this AS.
Finally, following the middlebox popularity, we evaluate
where, in its topology, an AS is likely to deploy a middlebox.
Two locations are envisioned: (i) at the border of the network
(meaning that it is most likely that the middlebox will process
every packet entering/leaving the AS network) or (ii) in
the core of the AS network (meaning that middleboxes are
deployed for very dedicated services and traffic). Table II
provides a global overview of middleboxes over the whole
dataset. The “other” category corresponds to cases where we
were unable to derive the offender position (for instance,
because all addresses were non publicly-routable), or where
the offender appears as being at the border of the AS for
some paths, and AS internal for others. Those two situations
appeared in 9.1% of the cases. Finally, a few offenders
appeared to have been moved from the border to the core, or
vice versa, from one campaign to another but this is a rare case
(1.7%). What we observe from Table II is that middleboxes
are mainly located at the border of ASes. This is aligned with
results presented in Fig. 6(b). Indeed, if the majority of paths,
within an AS, are affected by (at least) one middlebox, it is
expected to see this middlebox at the ingress (or egress) of
the AS, creating so a kind of bottleneck in which the majority
of the traffic must go through.
Fig. 6(c) shows the distribution of middleboxes location,
split in four categories, per ASes on which they are deployed.
The categories are the following: (i) TCP options: This
regroups traffic engineering middleboxes that modify, strip,
or add TCP options (MSS and SACKP), that we highlighted
based on the value of the actual TCP options, TCP offset, and
IP Length, (ii) TCP sequence number modification, security-
related middleboxes that sets the TCP initial sequence number
to randomly chosen value, (iii) IP-ID modification, middle-
boxes that sets the IP-ID field to unique non-null value for
each transmitted packet, and, (iv) NAT, middleboxes that re-
mapped the source port of our probes, often combined with
other previously described behavior.
We observed 254 ASes that deploy TCP options middle-
boxes, among which 88 deploy all of them at their border.
149 ASes deploy at least half of them at the border, 44 ASes
deploy all TCP options middleboxes in their core while 20
ASes also deploy such middleboxes, but we cannot conclude
on their positioning. 62 ASes are deploying Sequence Number
shuffling middleboxes. 31 ASes deploy all those middleboxes
at their border, while 48 ASes deploy at least half of their
shuffling middleboxes also at the border. Finally, only 4 ASes
deploy those middleboxes in their network core. 40 ASes
deployed middleboxes that checks for IP-ID uniqueness, 25
of them put all such middleboxes at their border, 5 others in
their core. 6 ASes were observed making use of NATs, but
without privileged position.
Overall, we found that ASes tend to deploy most of their
middleboxes at their border, at the exception of 65 ASes (19%
of the ASes with labelled middleboxes) that deploys at least
half of their middleboxes in their core.
V. MIDDLEBOXES PERSISTENCE
In this section, we analyze the persistence of middleboxes
over time. We consider that a middlebox is active during
a campaign if at least one of its offender IP address was
responsive during this campaign, and that it was used for
labeling. We consider a middlebox as inactive if at least one of
its offender IP address was responsive and none of them was
used for labeling. We take care to not count the cases were
the middlebox is not observable because of the absence of any
RFC1812-compliant informant router. Finally, a middlebox is
considered offline if none of its offender IP addresses were
responsive during a whole campaign.
From the set of labelled middlebox, we selected those that
were responsive to probes with HTTP and non-HTTP ports,
excluding middleboxes located on path portions invisible to
certain non-HTTP probes because of port-based blocking, to
be able to analyze their persistence through all the campaigns.
From the 8,005 labelled middleboxes, we selected 5,888 in
this manner.
We compute the dynamics by comparing the set of active
campaigns to the set of inactive campaigns. The middlebox
dynamic is thus the number of times the middlebox switched
from active state to inactive and vice versa. We chose to
ignore the offline states not to draw conclusions from the
absence of observations, to make sure that the address was
not simply unobservable (e.g., the probe took a different path).











(a) Global overview, state changes (per middlebox).













(b) Duration (per period, 8,788 active periods, 5,121
inactive ones).
Fig. 7. Middlebox Dynamics.
A value of zero means that a middlebox is constant (i.e.,
it is always up and running), while a value larger than one
provides the number of times a middlebox switches from an
active (respectively inactive) state to an inactive (respectively
active) state.
Fig. 7 displays the distribution of middleboxes dynamic.
In particular, Fig. 7(a) provides a general overview of how
middleboxes are affected by dynamics. We see that 51% of
the middleboxes are stable over time (i.e., a value of 0), the
corollary being that the other half of the middleboxes exhibits
a dynamic behavior. The second most frequent value is 2,
meaning that a middlebox will switch its state twice over the
measurement campaign. The maximum value, quite rare, is
ten, suggesting so that some middleboxes are very unstable
over time.
Fig. 7(b) gives the states duration in terms of consecutive
days for both active (plain line) and inactive (dashed line)
periods of middleboxes. To compute this figure, we normalized
campaigns durations to five days. The maximum duration for
an active period is 70 days (in 38% of the cases), i.e., the
whole measurement campaign duration. This corresponds to
middleboxes with a dynamic of 0. Moreover, we observe that
50% of the active periods are longer than 35 days (half of the
campaigns). Inversely, we notice that 44% of inactive periods
are short-lived, lasting only 5 days, while 20% of inactive
periods were longer than 20 days.
Globally, we showed on the one hand that the largest part
of middleboxes (more than 75%) tends to be constantly active,
or presenting few short periods of inactivity. On the other
hand, a minority of middleboxes are more dynamic, alternating
between active and inactive states 3 times or more.
Investigating the cause of middleboxes dynamic is left for
future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
Middleboxes are becoming more and more popular in
particular in enterprise networks. Those middleboxes are sup-
posed to be transparent to users but it has been shown the
contrary. In particular, they impact the TCP protocol and
its extensions. However, little is actually known on how
middleboxes are deployed by autonomous systems (ASes).
This is exactly what we tackled in this paper. Based on a
large-scale measurement campaign targeting Top 1M Alexa
Website, we studied how prevalent middleboxes are for ASes
and how persistent they are over time. Our observations
demonstrate that ASes do not deploy that much middleboxes
compared to standard Layer-3 devices. Those middleboxes do
not affect a large portion of the paths but are, in the majority,
deployed at the AS border. Finally, we also demonstrate that
the majority of middleboxes is stable over time.
In this paper, we focused on IPv4 wired networks. Future
works should highlight whether our conclusions are still valid
in emergent IPv6 networks. Further, with the rise of mobile
devices and mobile connections, it would be interesting to
push this study further by looking at middleboxes in mobile
networks using TraceboxAndroid [20].
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